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Background. In Switzerland, basic health insurance is mandatory for all inhabitants, but a rising number of
insured have arrears in premium payments, potentially leading to coverage suspension. We aimed at character-
izing insured with debt enforcement proceedings with respect to socio-demographic and health utilization as-
pects.
Methods. Cross-sectional analysis of 508.000 insured with basic health insurance contracts in 2013, of whom
14,000 (2.8%) with debt enforcement proceedings, from 11 Swiss cantons. Groups were characterized using lo-
gistic regression and latent class analysis.
Results. Insured with debt enforcement proceedings were more likely to be young, male and without depen-
dents (partner, kids). Having no supplementary insurance and receiving partial premium subsidies was associated
with an increased debt enforcement proceedings risk.
Within the debt enforcement proceedings group, three subgroups were identiﬁed: 60% were young and seem-
ingly healthy, with a below-average fraction of premium subsidy recipients (18%) and low out-of-pocket pay-
ments in prior year (median Swiss Francs 0).
Two groups consisted of relatively ill elderly persons (22%, 99% of whom with chronic illnesses) or families
(18%), many of whom (29% and 51%) were recipients of premium subsidies. Median out-of-pocket payments
in the prior year were high (Swiss Francs 625 and 688, respectively).
Conclusions. Sixty percent of premium arrears derive from young insured without apparent ﬁnancial prob-
lems; 40% are owed by elderly and families, which are potentially hurt by coverage loss.© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
For statuary health insurance, Switzerland has opted for a social
insurance system (Enthoven, 1978), which is characterized by manda-
tory enrollment into health plans, ﬁxed and comprehensive coverage
of drugs and treatments, and community-rated insurance premiums
(Thomson et al., 2013). Furthermore, income-dependent premium
subsidies are available for individuals in need. Those subsidies
should ensure universal access to care, which, according to the latest
OECD country assessment, has been widely achieved in Switzerland
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011).
Some authors have pointed out that access to care may not entirely
be universal in Switzerland, however. Around 40% of all health care ex-
penditures of CHF 65 billion in 2012 are carried by households, therebyidemiology, Biostatistics and
hengraben 84, CH-8001 Zurich,
. This is an open access article underleaving Swiss insured with the highest out-of-pocket payments for
health care of all OECD countries (OECD Health Data, 2013). It is well
known that high deductibles and co-payments can be a hindrance for
access to care, and surveys have shown that foregoing medical care for
economic reasons is quite prevalent in Switzerland (Guessous et al.,
2012; Wolff et al., 2011) and elsewhere (Wharam et al., 2007;
Galbraith et al., 2012). For example, the long-running Commonwealth
Foundation survey queries randomly selected inhabitants from 11
resource-rich countries (including Switzerland) on various aspects of
health care ﬁnancing and access to care (Schoen et al., 2010). In this sur-
vey, 10% of Swiss respondents reported not having sought a doctor or
not having reﬁlled a drug prescription for ﬁnancial reasons. This per-
centage was somewhat higher than in The Netherlands (6%) – with a
comparable health care system – and the UK (5%), but lower than, for
example, in Germany (25%) and the USA (33%). Surveys from the
Swiss canton of Geneva yielded a similar prevalence of foregone health
care (14%), which predominantly concerned dental care (75%), but also
specialist care (33%) and general practitioner appointments (15%)
(Guessous et al., 2012;Wolff et al., 2011). The Geneva study further re-
vealed that foregoing health care was – at least partially – driven bythe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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utilization in low-income strata. Furthermore, the Commonwealth
Fund survey discovered that individuals suffering from chronic condi-
tions (asthma or chronic lung problems, cancer, diabetes, or heart dis-
ease) were also more frequently experiencing ﬁnancial barriers to care
than healthy respondents in Switzerland (18% of chronically ill vs. 13%
of healthy individuals) (Schoen et al., 2013). This ﬁnding is particularly
disconcerting because delayed or foregone health care can exacerbate
chronic illnesses (Heisler et al., 2004).
Failure to pay for mandatory health insurance premiums can also
lead to limitations in access to care (c.f. (Crivelli, 2005; Crivelli,
2010)). In 2006, the Swiss parliament responded to a rising volume of
outstanding social health insurance premium bills with a legislation
change that allowed health insurers to suspend insurance coverage (ex-
cept for emergency treatment) until payment of all premium debts.
Subsequently, the number of individuals with coverage suspension
rose sharply from 89,000 in 2006 to almost 147,000 insured in 2010,
which corresponds to 1.9% of all Swiss inhabitants (Bundesamt für
Gesundheit, 2013). An additional 363,000 to 421,000 insured were
faced with at least one debt enforcement request for outstanding insur-
ance premiums, which is the initial step towards insolvency and asset
seizure. The sanctions for late premium payments were intended to
deter free-riding, especially by young and healthy individuals with
sufﬁcient income, but it soon turned out that they also hurt many
insuredwith ﬁnancial problems. For example, of all insured with cover-
age suspension during spring 2009 in the canton of Ticino, 30% had lim-
ited ﬁnancial means and received premium subsidies (Crivelli, 2010).
Those and other observations triggered the parliament to revise the
law in 2009. Effective since January 2012, health insurers are no longer
allowed to suspend coverage autonomously. Instead, they must
report late premium payers to cantonal authorities, and after initiation
of debt collection proceedings insurers are reimbursed 85% of the out-
standing debt by the cantons in return for maintaining health coverage.
Coverage suspension is still possible, but it must be initiated by cantons
after due consideration of an insured's circumstances of living (for in-
stance, insurance coverage cannot be suspended for children or persons
on welfare). As of 2014, 9 cantons have established “black lists” of in-
sured with suspended coverage (which are accessible by health care
providers), but the effectiveness of this measure is debated.
Little is known about the reasons for non-payment of health insur-
ance premiums in Switzerland. Given the possible implications of insur-
ance coverage suspension – particularly for ill individuals – this
knowledge gap is quite astounding. This cross-sectional study aimed
at characterizing the population of insured with debt enforcement pro-
ceedings due to outstanding health insurance premium bills. Secondly,
we performed an ecological analysis in which we explored how the
risk for missed premium payments is linked with household premium
burden and age (after adjustment for family status).Methods
Setting
Purchase of a basic insurance with standardized, comprehensive
coverage is required for all persons living in Switzerland. A minimum
deductible of CHF 300 (1 CHF = 1 USD or 0.833 EUR; EUR 245) and
co-payments of 10% up to a ceiling of CHF 700 (EUR 573) aremandatory
for all for insured N18 years, whereas children have no deductible and
co-payments are capped at half of the amount for adults.
Health insurance premiums are community-rated, but premium
reductions can be granted to children (mandatory), young adults (at
insurer's discretion) and for higher voluntary deductibles (ranging
fromCHF 500 [EUR 409] to CHF 2500 [EUR 2045] annually) or limitation
of physician/provider choice (voluntary gatekeeping and/or managed
care).Premium subsidies are available to individuals in need based on tax-
able income. Each canton has implemented its own subsidy systemwith
different eligibility criteria. Currently, 30% of all insured beneﬁt from
subsidies, with higher fractions among young insured aged 25 or less
and individuals aged 86 and above (Bundesamt für Gesundheit, 2013).
Assessments of the subsidy system have attested to its effectiveness to
keep the premiumburden below a pre-speciﬁed level, but these reports
also criticized that the growth of subsidy funds has not kept pace with
insurance premium increases (Kägi et al., 2012). Furthermore, several
cantons are discussing or have implemented additional restrictions to
subsidy access for economic reasons.
Debt enforcement proceedings for health insurance premiums are
governed by the Swiss Health Insurance Act. In case of missed premium
payments, after at least one warning letter insurers can start debt en-
forcement proceedings with cantonal authorities. If the bills remain un-
paid, the insurer can initiate asset seizure. If the liquidation of assets
does not generate enough funds to cover the unpaid bills, the insurer
will receive 85% of the outstanding debt from the canton in return for
maintenance of full insurance coverage for the indebted insured. How-
ever, cantons are allowed to sanction those debtors by limiting their
coverage to emergency treatment (i.e., by placing them on “black
lists”, which can be viewed by health care providers).
Data
Anonymized data was provided by CSS insurance, which is the larg-
est social health insurer in Switzerland with a market share of 16%. This
insurer's population of enrollees tends to be somewhat older and more
ill than the average Swiss population, but is otherwise very representa-
tive. Our study included insured with a mandatory health insurance
contract for the year 2013 (one year after the change in law forbidding
autonomous coverage suspension by insurers).
We only considered insured from eleven cantons in which premium
subsidies were handled by insurers (as opposed to direct subsidy pay-
ment to insured), and hence for which subsidy data were available
from the insurer. As a limitation for generalization, while all language
regions and both urban and rural cantonswere represented in this sam-
ple, the regions of Central and Eastern Switzerland could not be includ-
ed. Only one of these eleven cantons (Ticino) had implemented a “black
list” by 2013.
The insurer data contained information on socio-demographic
factors (age, sex, family status, place of living, eligibility for premium
subsidies), chosen insurance coverage (deductible level, supplemen-
tary insurance coverage), medical information (presence of chronic
illnesses as deﬁned by pharmaceutical cost groups (Lamers and van
Vliet, 2004), amount of reimbursed and out-of-pocket medical ex-
penditures in past year, hospitalizations in past year), and timing of
debt enforcement proceedings. Data on household income distribu-
tions were obtained from the Swiss Household Budget Survey
2006–2009 (Haushaltsbudgeterhebung (HABE)). Analyses were per-
formed at the level of “payers” for insurance premiums (e.g., parents
paying for children).
Statistical analysis
Payers of social insurance premiums were grouped into those with
and those without debt enforcement proceedings (control group) in
2013. Those groups were compared with respect to socio-demographic,
economic, and medical characteristics (see above) using univariable
andmultivariable logistic regression. Themultivariable model was con-
structed by adding all variables with a likelihood ratio p-value b0.2 in
the univariable regression to themultivariable regression (one variable
at a time). Confounding, effect modiﬁcations, and co-linearity of vari-
ables were assessed case-by-case on the basis of effect-size changes.
The ﬁnal model was restricted to variables with a p-value b0.05 by
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confounder variables.
In addition, latent class analysis was employed to identify distinct
subgroups among payers with debt enforcement proceedings based
on age, sex, family status, eligibility for premium subsidies, medical ex-
penditures in 2012 (grouped by quintile), and the presence of chronic
illnesses. The optimal number of subgroups was determined by com-
parison of the Aikaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion.
Data on premium burdens came from the Swiss Household Budget
Survey, which collects information on household income and expendi-
tures (e.g., for social health insurance or medical care). The premium
burden was calculated for each household in the survey sample as the
household's costs for social health insurance premiums, divided by the
reported disposable household income. Next, a prediction model for
premium burden was constructed on the basis of family status (5 cate-
gories), age groups (6 categories), and cantons (or regions in case of
small cantons, 9 categories) by use of linear regression. This prediction
model was then applied to all payers from the insurance sample to esti-
mate their premium burden in terms of income share. Likewise, a pre-
dicted risk for debt enforcement proceedings was estimated for each
payer in the insurance data on the basis of theﬁnalmultivariable logistic
regression model (see above).
Finally, those two predicted variables (premium burden and debt
enforcement risk) were analyzed by a third regression model to obtain
marginal effects of debt enforcement risk changes given a 1%-point
change in premium burden, adjusted for age and family status. These
marginal effect estimations were performed by use of a generalized lin-
ear model for proportions, weighed by the number of individuals per
stratum and by use of robust error variance (Papke and Wooldridge,
1996).
All analyses were performed with Stata 12.1 (Stata Corp., College
Station TX, USA) and with R (www.r-project.org) using the poLCA
package.
Sensitivity analysis
Individuals with debt enforcement proceedings may seem healthier
(in terms of absent or low health care utilization) because they may
have already lost their coverage before 2013 or may be forgoing care
because of co-payments. In order to investigate this potential bias, we
repeated all analyses on a subset of premium payers who also held a
basic health insurance contract in 2012 and who had not already been
exposed to debt foreclosure in the years 2011 and 2012. This selection
resulted in a smaller data set of 431,234 individuals (of whom 9049
with debt enforcement proceedings in 2013), which tended to be
older and more ill when compared with the sample used in the main
analysis (see online appendix, Table 1). However, the results from the
sensitivity analysis (including group classiﬁcations from latent class
analysis) were very similar to those from the main analysis, and there-
fore our conclusions were not altered (see online appendix, Table 2).
Results
Identiﬁcation of factors associated with debt enforcement for social health
insurance premiums
For this study, 507,975 recipients of premium bills from 11 cantons
were analyzed, of whom14,179 (2.8%)with debt enforcement proceed-
ings due to unpaid mandatory health insurance premiums in 2013. A
comparison of payers with debt enforcement with the control group is
displayed in Table 1. The group with debt enforcement was younger,
more oftenmale, andmore frequently consisted of single person house-
holds without a partner or children than the control group. They (and
their family members) also seemed healthier than their control coun-
terparts: 32% of payers and their associated family members of thedebt enforcement group had ﬁlled drug prescriptions that are speciﬁc
for a chronic illness, as opposed to 47% among controls. Likewise, the
amount of medical expenditures in 2012 was lower (median CHF 350)
when compared with controls (median CHF 1634).
Interestingly, eligibility for income-dependent premium subsidies
was similar between the two groups (25% vs 22.5% among controls),
but differences were registered with respect to supplementary insur-
ance coverage. In 2012, 74% of the control group, but only 25% of the
group with debt enforcement, had supplementary coverage. Further-
more, around one quarter (26.3%) of the debt enforcement group, but
only a small minority of the control group, had already had debt en-
forcement proceedings in 2012.
Many of the descriptive ﬁndings were conﬁrmed by the multivari-
able logistic regression analysis (Table 2, third column). Additionally,
the regression analysis revealed that family status was an important
risk factor: compared with single persons (reference), single persons
with dependent kids had a higher risk for debt enforcement (odds
ratio [OR], 2.1 [95% conﬁdence interval 1.9; 2.2]). Furthermore, the asso-
ciation of debt enforcement with eligibility for premium subsidies was
not monotonic but depended on the percentage of premiums covered
by subsidies. Receiving ≥2/3 of owed premiums as subsidywas associat-
ed with a reduced risk (OR, 0.5 [0.4; 0.5]) for debt enforcement; lower
subsidy amounts led to an increase (OR, 1.2 [1.2; 1.3] for both catego-
ries). Not having supplementary insurance was a strong predictor for
debt enforcement (OR, 6.3 [6.1; 6.6]), suggesting either limited ﬁnancial
means or a lack of need. Interestingly, low out-of-pocket expenditures
were also positively associated with debt enforcement risk (OR 1.6
[1.5; 1.7] and 1.2 [1.1; 1.2] for the two smallest quintiles).
Identiﬁcation of subgroups among debtors
We further exploredwhether the group of payerswith debt enforce-
ment may consist of distinct subgroups by use of latent class analysis.
This method yielded three subgroups (Table 3). The largest subgroup
1 containing 60% of all payers with debt enforcement mainly consisted
of young, predominantly male, single persons. Only few had had health
expenditures or an in-patient hospital stay in 2012, and only a small
percentage had drug prescriptions for a chronic illness. Further interest-
ing, the proportion of recipients of premium subsidies (16%) was below
the average of the control group (23%).
The second-largest payer group 2 (22%) mainly consisted of older,
single persons with high health care expenditures and who were fre-
quently ill (97% with chronic diseases, 16% with hospitalizations in
2012). Of further note, eligibility for premium subsidies was slightly
higher than in the control group, but almost 3 out of 4 payers had no
supplementary insurance coverage.
The third subgroup (18%) had comparatively high health care
expenditures in 2012, and relatively few had supplementary in-
surance coverage. This group seemed to consist predominantly of fam-
ilies with children, and 53% of these households received premium
subsidies.
Additional results from sensitivity analysis
The observation of overall lower health care expenditures for in-
sured with debt enforcement proceedings (Table 1) may be owing to
earlier coverage loss or (in settings with high out-of-pocket expendi-
tures) to foregone health care due to ﬁnancial problems. The sensitivity
analysis sample offered an opportunity to look at changes of health care
utilization patterns before and after debt enforcement proceedings. To
this end, within-individual changes of annual health care expenditures
between 2012 and 2013 were compared across the three latent class
groups and the control group (online appendix, Table 2). Interestingly,
comparisons of averages (standard deviations) suggested increases
in annual health care expenditures for group 1 [CHF 233 (3320)],
group 2 [CHF 258 (11,735)] and the control group [CHF 342 (10,000)]
Table 1
Baseline characteristics of Swiss insured with and without debt enforcement proceedings
(control group). Note that several variableswere collected in 2012, because theymay have
already been inﬂuenced by debt enforcement proceedings in 2013 (e.g., reimbursement
stop for medical expenditures or loss of supplementary insurance coverage). Numbers
are numbers of individuals and column percent unless stated otherwise.
Payer characteristics Control group Group with debt
enforcement
proceedings
N 493,796 (100%) 14,179 (100%)
Median age [IQR] 50 [36; 66] 41 [31; 51]
Male sex 268,790 (54.4%) 9379 (66.1%)
Nationality
Swiss 348,644 (70.6%) 8142 (57.4%)
Other 81,404 (16.5%) 4287 (30.2%)
Uknown 63,748 (12.9%) 1750 (12.3%)
Familty status
Single adult, no kids 343,883 (69.6%) 10,755 (75.9%)
Single adult with kids 42,094 (8.5%) 1557 (11.0%)
Couple with kids 48,817 (9.9%) 1085 (7.7%)
Couple, no kids 52,802 (10.7%) 586 (4.1%)
Other 6200 (1.3%) 196 (1.4%)
Chosen deductible (CHF per year)
300 (default) 219,503 (44.5%) 7644 (53.9%)
500 82,168 (16.6%) 2381 (16.8%)
1000 18,147 (3.7%) 593 (4.2%)
1500 73,365 (14.9%) 1854 (13.1%)
2000 19,808 (4.0%) 313 (2.2%)
2500 80,805 (16.4%) 1394 (9.8%)
Had an inpatient hospital or nursing home
stay of 3 days or more in 2012
50,044 (10.1%) 900 (6.3%)
Suffers from at least one chronic illness 232,566 (47.1%) 4479 (31.6%)
Type of chronic illness (pharmaceutical
cost group)
Malignancies, Cancer 21,935 (4.4%) 225 (1.6%)
Diabetes Type 2 32,310 (6.5%) 621 (4.5%)
HIV 2066 (0.4%) 116 (0.8%)
Renal disease, end stage renal disease 2871 (0.6%) 41 (0.3%)
High cholesteral and hypertension 60,234 (12.2%) 658 (4.6%)
Glaucoma 30,267 (6.1%) 160 (1.1%)
Diseases of the thyroid gland 26,899 (5.4%) 333 (2.3%)
Osteoporosis 17,720 (3.6%) 64 (0.5%)
Migraine 8450 (1.7%) 191 (1.3%)
Respiratory illnesses, Asthma, COPD 47,384 (9.6%) 1037 (7.3%)
Depression 71,174 (14.4%) 1644 (11.6%)
Chronic psychosis 9199 (1.9%) 176 (1.2%)
Dependency (alcohol/heroin) 4925 (1.0%) 256 (1.8%)
Alzheimer's disease 3304 (0.7%) 12 (0.1%)
Neuropathic pain 7260 (1.5%) 146 (1.0%)
Epilepsy 10,738 (2.2%) 228 (1.6%)
Rheumatologic conditions 46,266 (9.4%) 470 (3.3%)
Cardiac diseases 28,390 (5.7%) 249 (1.8%)
Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis 6177 (1.3%) 78 (0.6%)
Acid peptic disease 89,249 (18.1%) 1525 (10.8%)
Insulin-dependent Diabetes 6476 (1.3%) 161 (1.1%)
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t-test N0.8; also see online appendix, Table 2 and online appendix,
Fig. 1 for group-speciﬁc medians and interquartile ranges). Only group
3 [CHF−554 (8152)] showed evidence for a reduction of health care
utilization (p-value for expenditure decrease by one-sample t-test =
0.0024). Overall, these analyses are consistent with the hypothesis of
intrinsically lowhealth care consumption among the group of young in-
sured with debt enforcement proceedings (group 1), although longer
observation periods would be needed to fully rule out an effect of fore-
gone health care.
Ecologic study: Is the risk for debt enforcement correlatedwith levels of pre-
mium burden?
Next, we explored how the probability for debt enforcement pro-
ceedings was associated with the premium burden, thereby exploiting
the variability of premium levels across different cantons. Table 4 dis-
plays regression results for six age groups, which were structured so
as to ﬁt those used by the household budget survey, and adjusted for
family status. As expected, the risk change per 1%-point premium in-
crease was positive across all age groups. In other words, within each
age group regions with higher premium levels also tended to show
higher rates of debt foreclosure proceedings. (See Fig. 1.) Yet themagni-
tude of this effect was dependent on the payer's age. Table 4 suggests
that the lower the age the greater the risk change for debt enforcement
per 1%-point higher premium burden.
Discussion
This analysis of a representative sample of Swiss inhabitants re-
vealed that failure to pay for social health insurance premiums (and
subsequent initiation of debt enforcement proceedings) is a multifacto-
rial problem. Thepopulation of insuredwith debt enforcement proceed-
ings can be classiﬁed into three quite homogenous groups. The largest
fraction (60%) consists of predominantly young, seemingly healthy in-
sured. Only 15% of those individuals are eligible for premium subsidies,
and they have the smallest average premiumburden (as estimated from
data of the Swiss household budget survey). Yet, the data are inconclu-
sive with respect to potential motives for not paying the premiums. The
income-related information imply that this group may have had ample
ﬁnancial means to pay for premiums, hence indeed pointing towards
negligence or protest. Alternatively, it is possible that these young in-
sured did not have enough funds to cover premiums but failed to
apply for or were not considered eligible for premium subsidies. A
lack of knowledge about the Swiss health care systemmay also be a pos-
sible explanation (Rossini and Fischer, 2012). But, given the low healthParkinson's disease 4940 (1.0%) 34 (0.2%)
Transplantations 1028 (0.2%) 22 (0.2%)
Receives no premium subsidies 382,897 (77.5%) 10,638 (75.0%)
Tertiles of premium subsidies
(for those who are eligible)
Subsidies cover between 1% and 27%
of premium costs
36,716 (7.4%) 1431 (10.1%)
Subsidies cover between 28% and 68%
of premium costs
36,762 (7.4%) 1385 (9.8%)
Subsidies cover more than 69% of
premium costs
37,421 (7.6%) 725 (5.1%)
Has no supplementary insurance a 123,407 (25.0%) 9814 (69.2%)
Had supplementary insurance in 2012 366,006 (74.1%) 3559 (25.1%)
Already had a debt foreclosure in 2012 144 (0.0%) 3736 (26.3%)
Median health care expenditures in 2012
[IQR]
1634 [107; 5426] 350 [0; 2559]
Had no health care expenditures in 2012 109,238 (22.1%) 5111 (36.0%)
Quartiles of health care expenditures in
2012(for those with costs N0)
Between CHF 1 and CHF 816 85,508 (17.3%) 3334 (23.5%)
Between CHF 817 and CHF 2637 99,353 (20.1%) 2242 (15.8%)
Between CHF 2638 and CHF 6915 99,720 (20.2%) 1876 (13.2%)
More than CHF 6916 99,977 (20.2%) 1616 (11.4%)Fig. 1. Scatter plot of average premium burden in 2013 with estimated risk for debt en-
forcement proceedings, stratiﬁed by age group.
Table 2
Logistic regression analysis of factors associated with debt enforcement proceedings for
Swiss insured in 2013.
Payer characteristics Univariable model;
odds ratio [95% CI]
Multivariable
model; odds
ratio [95% CI]
Age, per year increase 0.84 [0.84; 0.85] 0.88 [0.87; 0.88]
Male sex 1.64 [1.58; 1.69] 1.75 [1.68; 1.81]
Nationality
Swiss 1 1
Other 2.26 [2.17; 2.34] 1.24 [1.19; 1.30]
Uknown 1.18 [1.12; 1.24] 2.01 [1.89; 2.12]
Familty status
Single adult, no kids 1 1
Single adult with kids 1.18 [1.12; 1.25] 2.05 [1.93; 2.18]
Couple with kids 0.71 [0.67; 0.76] 1.02 [0.95; 1.09]
Couple, no kids 0.35 [0.33; 0.39] 0.58 [0.53; 0.64]
Other 1.01 [0.88; 1.17] 0.73 [0.63; 0.85]
Has high deductible of CHF 1000 or more 1.54 [1.48; 1.59]
Had an inpatient hospital or nursing
home stay of 3 days or more in 2012
0.60 [0.56; 0.64]
Suffers from at least one chronic illness 0.52 [0.50; 0.54] 1.15 [1.10; 1.21]
Type of chronic illness (pharmaceutical cost group)
Malignancies 0.35 [0.30; 0.40]
Diabetes Type 2 0.68 [0.62; 0.73]
HIV 1.96 [1.63; 2.37]
Renal disease, end stage renal disease 0.50 [0.36; 0.68]
High cholesteral and hypertension 0.35 [0.32; 0.38]
Glaucoma 0.17 [0.15; 0.20]
Diseases of the thyroid gland 0.42 [0.37; 0.47]
Osteoporosis 0.12 [0.10; 0.16]
Migraine 0.78 [0.68; 0.91]
Respiratory illnesses, Asthma, COPD 0.74 [0.70; 0.79]
Depression 0.78 [0.74; 0.82]
Chronic psychosis 0.66 [0.57; 0.77]
Dependency (alcohol/heroin) 1.83 [1.61; 2.07]
Alzheimer's disease 0.13 [0.07; 0.22]
Neuropathic pain 0.70 [0.59; 0.82]
Epilepsy 0.74 [0.64; 0.84]
Rheumatologic conditions 0.33 [0.30; 0.36]
Cardiac diseases 0.29 [0.26; 0.33]
Acid peptic disease 0.44 [0.35; 0.55]
Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis 0.55 [0.52; 0.58]
Insulin-dependent diabetes 0.86 [0.74; 1.01]
Parkinson's disease 0.24 [0.17; 0.33]
Transplantations 0.74 [0.49; 1.14]
Receives no premium subsidies 1 1
Subsidies cover between 1% and 27%
of premium costs
1.40 [1.33; 1.48] 1.24 [1.17; 1.32]
Subsidies cover between 28% and 68%
of premium costs
1.36 [1.28; 1.44] 1.22 [1.15; 1.30]
Subsidies cover more than 69% of
premium costs
0.70 [0.65; 0.75] 0.46 [0.42; 0.49]
Has no supplementary insurance a 6.75 [6.51; 7.00] 6.30 [6.05; 6.56]
Had no health care expenditures in 2012 1
Between CHF 1 and CHF 816 0.83 [0.80; 0.87]
Between CHF 817 and CHF 2637 0.48 [0.46; 0.51]
Between CHF 2638 and CHF 6915 0.40 [0.38; 0.42]
More than CHF 6916 0.35 [0.33; 0.37]
Had no out-of-pocket-payment in 2012s 1 1
Between CHF 1 and CHF 384 0.87 [0.83; 0.91] 1.57 [1.49; 1.65]
Between CHF 385 and CHF 708 0.50 [0.47; 0.52] 1.17 [1.11; 1.24]
Between CHF 709 and CHF 1165 0.38 [0.36; 0.40] 0.97 [0.91; 1.04]
Between CHF 1166 and CHF 11,275 0.32 [0.30; 0.34] 0.93 [0.87; 1.00]
a This variable describes individuals who had no private insurance in 2012 and 2013,
excluding those who lost private insurance coverage due to unpaid private insurance
premiums.
Table 1 (continued)
Payer characteristics Control group Group with debt
enforcement
proceedings
Median of total out-of-pocketexpenditures
in 2012 [IQR]
544 [74; 1030] 260 [0; 655]
Had no out-of-pocket-payments in 2012 109,647 (22.2%) 5125 (36.1%)
Quartiles of out-of-pocket payments in 2012
Between CHF 1 and CHF 384 84,961 (17.2%) 3459 (24.4%)
Between CHF 385 and CHF 708 99,292 (20.1%) 2317 (16.3%)
Between CHF 709 and CHF 1165 99,883 (20.2%) 1783 (12.6%)
Between CHF 1166 and CHF 11,275 100,013 (20.3%) 1495 (10.5%)
a This variable describes individuals who had no private insurance in 2012 and 2013,
excluding those who lost private insurance coverage due to unpaid private insurance
premiums.
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ward that those young insured may be the ones who suffer least from a
possible suspension of coverage.
The two remaining subgroups (40%) of persons with debt enforce-
ment proceedings mainly consisted of ill, elderly individuals or families
with children. Both subgroups had greater than average health care ex-
penditures, and the proportion of individuals with premium subsidies
was also larger than in the control population. Further noteworthy, as
opposed to the majority of individuals from the control group, compar-
atively few individuals of subgroups 2 and 3 had supplementary insur-
ance coverage, which may also be a sign for limited income. Given their
previous record of health care utilization and the abundance of chronic
illnesses in these two subgroups, it is likely that the failure to pay for
premiums reﬂects a ﬁnancial crisis. Sanctioning these individuals by a
coverage suspension may be counterproductive because many of
them are dependent on regular medical care and treatment. Further-
more, it is well documented that foregone medical care for chronic
illnesses may lead to even more costly emergency interventions
(Kullgren et al., 2010; Wharam et al., 2007).
Our observations are in line with the (to our knowledge) only other
existing Swiss investigation into reasons for premium payment arrears
(cited in (Crivelli, 2010)). This report describes a population of insured
with insurance coverage suspension from the canton of Ticino and was
based on data from 2009 (i.e., before the legislation change). Similar to
our study, young age, being single and receiving premiums subsidies
were identiﬁed as risk factors for coverage suspension. This study fur-
ther noted that a staggering 83% of these insured had already faced
debt enforcement proceedings previously (other than for premium ar-
rears) and that 75% had been subject to coverage suspension for
18 months or longer at study baseline. Our analysis extends those ﬁnd-
ings by covering a larger geographical area and by identiﬁcation of dis-
tinct sub-groups among insured with premium payment arrears.
Despite the availability of premium subsidies, the Swiss mode of so-
cial health insurance ﬁnancing by community-rating is known to be re-
gressive, meaning that individuals with lower incomes have to spend a
much higher share for premiums (Bilger, 2008; Crivelli and Salari,
2012). Furthermore, because of steep annual premium increases (aver-
age 4% per year), the premium burden is increasingly considered to
reach unbearable levels in the eye of the public. Indeed, up to 43% of
all respondents in a representative, long-running survey reported occa-
sional or permanent problems in paying for premiums (Longchamp et
al., 2012) (a ﬁnding that was also conﬁrmed by international surveys
(Schoen et al., 2010; Schoen et al., 2013)). A switch to an income-
dependent premium system has been suggested to improve equity in
health ﬁnance, but repeatedly failed to gain enough votes in popular ref-
erenda (e.g., (Perneger and Hudelson, 2005)). Furthermore, the support
for the status quo system currently still seems to be strong (Jannot and
Perneger, 2014; Longchamp et al., 2012). Interestingly, a preference for
the current regional ﬂat-fee system over an income dependent system
even prevails among Swiss physicians (Jannot and Perneger, 2014).This study has strengths and limitations. The analysis builds upon a
study population that is representative for Switzerland and has beneﬁt-
ed from detailed (but anonymized) access to information on premium
payments and debt enforcement, which are usually not available for re-
search.Unfortunately, only limited information onhouseholds' ﬁnancial
situations were directly available from the insurer. To mitigate this
problem we imputed average household incomes from a second data
Table 3
Subgroups of Swiss individuals with debt enforcement proceedings in 2013 as identiﬁed by latent class analysis. Numbers are number of individuals and column percent unless stated
otherwise.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 No debt enforcement
N 8071 (100%) 2959 (100%) 2398 (100%) 459,047 (100%)
Median age [IQR] 36 [28; 48] 51 [39; 60] 42 [34; 48] 50 [36; 66]
Male sex 5960 (73.8%) 1818 (61.4%) 1074 (44.8%) 248,566 (54.1%)
Nationality
Swiss 4529 (56.1%) 1838 (62.1%) 1335 (55.7%) 321,516 (70.0%)
Other 2641 (32.7%) 596 (20.1%) 853 (35.6%) 77,673 (16.9%)
Unknown 901 (11.2%) 525 (17.7%) 210 (8.8%) 59,858 (13.0%)
Family status
Single adult, no kids 7506 (93.0%) 2666 (90.1%) 23 (1.0%) 320,652 (69.9%)
Single adult with kids 210 (2.6%) 6 (0.2%) 1285 (53.6%) 39,720 (8.7%)
Couple with kids 105 (1.3%) 16 (0.5%) 893 (37.2%) 44,937 (9.8%)
Couple, no kids 223 (2.8%) 271 (9.2%) 38 (1.6%) 47,846 (10.4%)
Other 27 (0.3%) 0 (0%) 159 (6.6%) 5892 (1.3%)
Suffers from at least one chronic illness 138 (1.7%) 2957 (99.9%) 1187 (49.5%) 216,447 (47.2%)
Had an inpatient hospital or nursing home stay of 3 days or more in 2012 151 (1.9%) 423 (14.3%) 280 (11.7%) 46,423 (10.1%)
Median health care expenditures in 2012 [IQR] 0 [0; 446] 2670 [594; 7193] 2952 [1079; 7196] 1640 [107; 5446]
Median of total out-of-pocket expenditures in 2012 [IQR] 0 [0; 319] 625 [348; 1018] 688 [352; 1181] 544 [75; 1030]
Low deductible ≤ CHF 500 5037 (62.4%) 2589 (87.5%) 1842 (76.8%) 281,300 (61.3%)
Recipient of premium subsidies 1439 (17.8%) 853 (28.8%) 1232 (51.4%) 110,790 (24.1%)
Estimate of premium burden (Median % of disposable income [IQR]) 6.9 [5.9; 7.6] 7.5 [6.4; 8.7] 8.5 [7.5; 9.7] 7.7 [6.4; 10.3]
Has no supplementary insurance a 5748 (71.2%) 2207 (74.6%) 1299 (54.2%) 112,498 (24.5%)
a This variable describes individuals who had no private insurance in 2012 and 2013, excluding those who lost private insurance coverage due to unpaid private insurance premiums.
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that the conclusions derived from this procedure are robust, because
our ﬁndings are in line with other Swiss studies (Gardiol et al., 2013).
Subsequently, this premium burden information was correlated with
predicted debt foreclosure risks, which suggests that age groups re-
spond differently to higher premium burden. In particular, the largest
debt foreclosure risk increases per 1%-point higher premium burden
were observed among younger insured. Similar age-dependent dynam-
ics are, for example, known from studies that investigate reasons for in-
surance carrier switches (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009). Although the
results from the ecological analysis seem plausible, they are prone to
many biases, and further conﬁrmation through other studies is needed.
Moreover, the cross-sectional study design and the lack of detailed lon-
gitudinal data also have to be considered limitations for the interpreta-
tion of our results. It is important to note that all ﬁndings merely
represent associations, and that no causal relationships can be inferred
from this study.
Two important conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, it seems
important that equity of health ﬁnancing would be enhanced by
strengthening the subsidy system, which is an integral part of the
Swiss health system to guarantee universal access to care. Second, the
data imply that coverage suspension for non-payment of premiums
may be harmful to a substantial group of individuals with health prob-
lems. By the same token, such sanctions are likely to have little effect
on the majority of individuals with debt foreclosure proceedings be-
cause they are young and appear to have low levels of health careTable 4
Ecological analysis of premium burden (share of premiums on income) and risk for debt
enforcement proceedings. The table shows average marginal effects of a 1%-point change
in premium burden on the percent risk for debt enforcement proceedings, by age group.
Age
group
N Average Marginal Effects
(%-point change in risk
per %-point change in
premium burden)
[95% conﬁdence
interval]
18–34 114,676 1.435 [1.428; 1.442]
35–44 80,280 1.013 [1.007; 1.020]
45–54 90,688 0.944 [0.939; 0.950]
55–64 70,759 0.554 [0.550; 0.557]
65–74 58,237 0.175 [0.173; 0.177]
75+ 57,396 0.042 [0.042; 0.043]utilization. Further investigations into the motives and economic cir-
cumstances for non-payment of social health insurance premiums
would aid to design more effective measures for improvement of soli-
darity without harming vulnerable populations.
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